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Incluso um folheto intitulado

Rosas and His Calumniators

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The
Justice and Policy
of a
Triple Alliance Intervention
of
England, France, and Brazil

Considered
in Letters
to the Right Honorable
the Earl of Aberdeen, K.T., F.R.S.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs etc etc

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By Alfred Mallalieu, Esq.

London:
Effingham Wilson, Royal Exchange
1845. (111 pags.)

Começa o a. por alludir a outro pamphleto sobre o mesmo assumpto, intitulado: Buenos Ayres, Monte Video and Affairs in the River Plate; in a Letter to the Earl of Aberdeen, Blackwood and Sons, February 1844 que publicou no anno anterior.

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pag. 3 — O bloqueio do governo de Buenos Ayres ~~[illegible]~~ não se pode dizer que afectasse nenhum interesse commercial da ~~France~~ Inglaterra e France, no atrito, a benefício do principio da Nacionalidade. Cidade de Lancashire, a West Riding, a hardware de Birmingham, as soieries de Lyon e as bijouteries de Paris tinham o + pleno emprego como antes. —

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pag. 89 — Repetindo, se a um breve discurso de Sir Robert Peel sobre a questão do Prata na casa dos communs (?) sobre representações feitas pela Ingl. e France ~~[illegible]~~ em combinação, ao que se esperava, com o Brasil, justo à pontos em omplitto, escreve: "Now I am bold to assert, without fear of contradiction from your Lordship, that Brazil was the first instigator ~~[illegible]~~, as now the first mover, to the intervention ~~[illegible]~~ proposed" Alude a Missão Abrantes, a plenipo-

que representou o assentimento do Brazil "as a party to the triple contract, an assent which need not be doubted from that feeble and disorganised State..." — — — — Critica o facto de Peel desejar "to screen Brazil (....) from the ire and vengeance of General Rosas, whose nod alone would suffice almost to shake that unwieldy wilderness of an intemperate empire into convulsions and fractions." No one doubts, however (Rosas least of all), the prominent position, however apprehensively sought to be disguised, which the cabinet of Rj, prompted moreover by French influence and counsel, has ~~[illegible]~~ really thought proper to assume — the leadership of intromission in the affairs of the River Plate which underhand it affects and acts up to, whilst outwardly and timidly it abnegates. The relations of the Baron of Caxias, Brazilian Governor and Commander in Chief of Rio Grande, with Rivera, principal promoter, as the Monte Videan chief has been, of the rebellions and revolutions of that insurgent province; the clumsy and transparent intrigues in the case of General Paz, the rebellious exiled ex-gover-

nor of one of the federal Argentine States (first ostentatiously arrested in Rio, then secretly assisted in a scarcely clandestine evasion, next stopped at Santa Catharina, the governor of which had not been timely apprised of the plot, lastly, released on intimation from head quarters, and supplied with all necessary convenience for prosecuting his journey through Brazilian territory to Corrientes, then, as now, in insurrection against the authority of Buenos Ayres; ~~has have other machinations~~ there to take the command of the insurgent forces): these treacherous machinations, ~~and the suspicions increase~~ I say, could not impose upon the ~~the~~ acuteness of a statesman like Rosas, of which, indeed, the undissembled expression may be found in the journals of Buenos Ayres. Nor have other machinations, and the suspicious increase of the Brazilian flotilla off Monte Video escaped animadversion; although, if the fleet of Brazil be no more terribly-minded than her land forces, no very sanguinary results need be feared. In Rio Grande, battles last a whole day, and triumph must be dearly purchased indeed which costs a dozen killed and twice as many wounded. M. de Chavagnes, a French traveller, in a recent publication entitled, Le Brésil en 1844, has the

following piquant bulletin of a siege and a battle at Caïthe, a small town of about 4000 inhabitants in the province of Minas Geraes, at the period of the insurrection in that province and San Paulo, in 1843: "Caïthe", he says, "a soutenu un siège pendant les derniers troubles. Après un engagement brusque qui dura cinq jours, on ne compte que deux hommes blessés par des balles qui avaient éclaté. Les deux ~~parties~~ partis agissaient avec une prudence dont les exemples ne sont pas rares dans les guerres intérieures du Brésil." The generals and statesmen of Brazil prefer to buy off their foes peacefully with mil reis de plata, instead of slaughtering, or standing to be slaughtered with ball and bayonet. Baron de Caxias was indebted for his triumph over the insurgents of San Paulo, so loudly trumpeted in Europe, to gold much more than guns. Colonel Martins, the effective and most fighting leader of the insurgent array, found the golden of the Bardo irresistible if his legions were not; so he basely bargained away his cause and comrades for moedas de ouro, military promotion and fazendas of square leagues. The astute Brazilian chief is playing the same game with the insurgents of Rio Grande, where, if Bento ~~Gonçalves Gonçalez~~ Gonçalez and Canavarro are impenetrable to the seductive currency doctrines of "paid cashe" and "no flinchy", subordinate satellites are not.

For the rest, the government of Brazil, therefore, being

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on the verge of irretrievable insolvency, with a revenue scarcely more than half equal to an expenditure prodigally calculated according to territorial immensity rather than its sparse scattering of population, and with an admitted annual deficit of 10 or 12 thousands contos, say between 2 and 3 millions sterling, should be fully occupied with the consideration of the ways and means for repairing financial derangements and dilapidations, and for consolidating the internal resources and tranquillity of a young and distracted empire, rather than with baseless visions of external aggrandisement, and the extension of an already overgrown and unma-